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	15 March 1974	
25X1	NOTE FOR:	
	SUBJECT: Deception	
	I have the following observations from the session with	25X1
	It is probably worthwhile to take a fresh look at the PI/analytical effort going into review, cataloguing, and analysis, of secondary "benign" installations and activities. Much less effort is assigned to them than against the primary, known-to-be important problems and targets.	
	The need, then, is to determine the importance of obtaining and maintaining a higher level of knowledge on secondary things vs. the size of the effort and cost required to achieve it. I believe this is much more a problem of photointerpretation and analysis, than it is collection. Further, the question is not one of whether "deception" is recognized as a subject, or a possibility, but rather how seriously (in an absolute sense) one takes that possibility into account.	
25X1	By way of example: It is technically feasible to perform continuing photointerpretation on the imagery obtained of, say, a bicycle plant in a Soviet city. It will be imaged several times a year, at least.  Such a facility could be analyzed on a multisource basis  with the same level of completeness and detail as a weapons facility of known high importance. The only reason it is not, is the assumption that it is a bicycle plant and hence each time it is photographed it is reviewed primarily in the context of whether significant visible change appears. We know PI's are human and sometimes miss important findings; some safeguards (multiple looks, all-source support data, etc.) exist. Much more could be applied, but it would cost money	25X1
	and people.  I suggest that you define a couple of situations (scenarios) which might be, and let me evaluate from the imagery standpoint how I would visualize dealing with (finding) them. Then let's take stock.	
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